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Creditors, Keepers:
Passive Retention of Estate Property
and the Automatic Stay
The automatic stay provision is one of the most important provisions in
the Bankruptcy Code. Until recently, however, it has remained unclear if
passive retention of property of the bankruptcy estate must be immediately
turned over to the debtor under the automatic stay provision. The Supreme
Court decided in City of Chicago v. Fulton that passive retention does not violate
the automatic stay, saving creditors from the consequences of retaining estate
property. The debate about the stay, however, is far from over. Many circuit
courts were already concerned about the policy issues deriving from the City of
Chicago maintaining possession over debtors’ vehicles, rendering debtors
unable to get to work or pay off their debts during the bankruptcy plan. Justice
Sotomayor remains frustrated about these policy concerns and called on
Congress to change the Code and enable debtors to be more successful in their
payment plans. This Note suggests Congress make language and cross-reference
changes to the Bankruptcy Code to satisfy both textual and policy issues
associated with the current Code.
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INTRODUCTION
Chicago, one of the largest and most racially segregated cities in
America, is undergoing issues with bankruptcy on many levels.
Currently itself under threat of filing for municipal bankruptcy,1 it also
leads the nation in chapter 13 bankruptcy filings.2 The concentration of
these filings is three times higher in predominantly Black
neighborhoods,3 adding more tension to a highly segregated city.4 In
fact, the rate of filings by Black residents in the Northern District of
Illinois rose eighty-eight percent between 2011 and 2015.5 While this
1.
Richard Porter, Commentary: Bankruptcy Looms for Chicago If There’s No Pension Fix,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 26, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ctopinion-bankruptcy-chicago-pensions-crisis-20190926-4iwzdnfcjzh2tac7pw6i5fbgea-story.html
[https://perma.cc/3PW3-MB4L].
2.
City Unveils Vehicle Sticker Amnesty, Ticket Relief Programs for Scofflaw Drivers, CBS
CHI. (Sept. 27, 2019, 11:47 AM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/09/27/city-unveils-vehiclesticker-amnesty-ticket-relief-programs-for-scofflaw-drivers/
[https://perma.cc/3AEK-L9UC].
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is for debtors who earn a regular income and therefore can pay in an
installment plan created during the bankruptcy case. Chapter 13 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcybasics (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8F4U-B6HR]. This chapter often allows debtors
to keep their homes or cars. Id.
3.
Women in Cook County’s Communities of Color File Bankruptcy at Disproportionately
High Rates, Finds New Report, WOODSTOCK INST., (May 3, 2011, 4:00 AM),
https://woodstockinst.org/news/press-release/women-cook-countys-communities-color-filebankruptcy-disproportionately-high-rates-finds-new-report/ [https://perma.cc/NC24-ZFA4].
4.
Detroit, Chicago, Memphis: The 25 Most Segregated Cities in America, USA TODAY (July
20, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/money/2019/07/20/detroit-chicagomemphis-most-segregated-cities-housing-policies/1780223001/ [https://perma.cc/7K9E-A6RA].
5.
Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System Is Failing Black Americans,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://features.propublica.org/bankruptcy-inequality/bankruptcyfailing-black-americans-debt-chapter-13/ [https://perma.cc/XF4D-L3HM].
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may confound the average reader, many people familiar with the city
wholeheartedly believe they know the cause—parking tickets.6
Often, unpaid parking tickets will result in the city seizing a car
and selling it for scrap metal.7 Debtors, unable to pay off the parking
tickets, file for bankruptcy to help them get control of their finances.8
Before the summer of 2019, however, the City of Chicago was able to
hold onto debtors’ cars for months before proceedings for the turnover
of the cars made their way through the bankruptcy courts.9 Without a
reliable way to get to work, many debtors were inhibited from
successfully completing their debt repayment plans.10 The city recently
succeeded at the Supreme Court in its efforts to return to its former
policy.11 Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Fulton in
January 2021, the city can hold onto debtors’ cars until an adversary
proceeding is completed for their turnover.12 This process takes an
average of one hundred days.13
Prior to the Court’s most recent ruling, circuits were split over
whether passive retention of a debtor’s property possessed prior to a
bankruptcy filing violates one of the Bankruptcy Code’s most treasured
provisions—the automatic stay.14 Generally, the automatic stay
immediately stops creditors’ collection efforts once a debtor files for
bankruptcy, though there are specific provisions of the Code that define
the scope of the stay.15 The Code currently prohibits “any act . . . to
exercise control over property of the estate.”16 Five circuits, including
6.
Edward R. Morrison & Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies 2
(Columbia L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 550, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2845497 [https://perma.cc/NB25-7GZ5]; City Unveils Vehicle Sticker Amnesty, Ticket
Relief Programs for Scofflaw Drivers, supra note 2.
7.
Elliott Ramos & Claudia Morell, Lawsuits, Stalled Legislation, and New Mayor. What’s
Going on with Chicago’s Ticketing Reform?, WBEZ (June 7, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wbez.org/
shows/wbez-news/chicago-ticketing-and-towing-facing-lawsuits-stalled-legislation-lori-lightfootticket-reform/20826dc6-4d9e-4027-8645-d338f4ac238f [https://perma.cc/XR9B-E8XG].
8.
Edward Morrison, Parking Tickets Drive Bankruptcy’s Racial Disparity, COLUM. L. SCH.
(Oct. 24, 2019), https://clawstage.ohodev.com/news/archive/parking-tickets-drive-bankruptcysracial-disparity [https://perma.cc/DVK6-QYGL].
9.
Melissa Sanchez, Chicago Can’t Hold Impounded Vehicles After Drivers File for
Bankruptcy, Court Says, PROPUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/article/chicago-driversbankruptcies-impounded-vehicles-federal-appeals-court
(last
updated
Oct.
3,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/83KM-LM7M].
10. Id.
11. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 587 (2021).
12. Id. at 591.
13. Id. at 594 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
14. Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986) (citing S. REP.
NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978)).
15. Automatic Stay, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE DICTIONARY OF BANKRUPTCY
TERMS (3d ed. 2020).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
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the Seventh Circuit, which sits in Chicago, previously held that passive
retention of property of the estate violates the automatic stay.17 Three
circuits disagreed and held the opposite.18 The Supreme Court sided
with the circuit minority, unanimously holding that passive retention
of estate property does not violate the automatic stay.19 While the
Court’s recent decision adheres to the text of the Code, it does not
adhere to the policy goals of bankruptcy law. Although both competing
approaches had textual analysis supporting their divergent opinions,
the minority approach, recently adopted by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the statute’s words, is more textually persuasive.20 But
the minority approach does not embody the strongest policy
considerations Congress had in mind while drafting the Bankruptcy
Code.21 Therefore, the judicial opinion from the Supreme Court still
cannot fully resolve the issue.
This Note proposes that the language in § 362(a)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Code be amended to prohibit “any exercise of control over
property of the estate that the debtor may require for the successful
completion of its payment plan confirmed under chapters 12 and 13.”
Only then will bankruptcy law reflect the policy goals originally
imagined by Congress and remain faithful to the text of the statute. If
implemented, this amendment would require the City of Chicago to
return debtors’ cars once the debtors file for bankruptcy, enabling
debtors to get to work and contribute toward the payment plan essential
to chapter 13 bankruptcy cases.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the automatic stay
and related provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. Part II discusses the
difficulty that lower courts had in interpreting § 362(a)(3) and the
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Fulton. Lastly, Part III argues that
the Supreme Court decision interpreting the Code is unsatisfactory and
that Congress needs to amend the Bankruptcy Code because it is the
only way to effectuate the policy concerns rooted in the American
bankruptcy system while staying true to the statutory text.

17. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019); Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72
(2d Cir. 2013); Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier), 376 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2004)
(per curiam); Cal. Emp. Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996);
Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1989). Property of the estate
includes all of the debtor’s interests in any property as of the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 541.
18. In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2019); WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re
Cowen), 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
19. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 587 (2021).
20. See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing the minority’s focus on “act”).
21. See infra Section II.B.2 (noting policy concerns).
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I. A BREATH OF FRESH AIR: THE HISTORY OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay
provision, dictates whether a creditor must immediately return a
debtor’s property or risk sanctions. Analyzing the effects of the stay,
however, requires an understanding of other provisions of the Code
such as § 361, the adequate protection provision, and § 542, the
turnover provision. These provisions apply to all chapters of
bankruptcy.22 While the Fulton decision answered the questions
regarding passive retention of estate property under § 362(a), it punted
many of the other questions about how the Bankruptcy Code’s multiple
provisions shape interactions between creditors and debtors.23 Before
turning to the ultimate issue of whether property seized before a debtor
filed for bankruptcy must be promptly returned to a debtor, this Note
will briefly summarize how these provisions were developed, how they
fit together in the greater scheme of the Code, and the questions yet to
be satisfactorily answered about their interaction.
A. The History of the Bankruptcy Code and Relevant Provisions
The main purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to “aid the
unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life,” and the Code
remains “not only of private but of great public interest.”24 Many
debtors utilize the Code to fairly and methodically pay back their
creditors. For individuals, chapter 13 bankruptcy is often the most
attractive option.25 Chapter 13, as opposed to chapter 7, allows debtors
to maintain possession of their property, discharge certain debts that
would not be dischargeable under chapter 7, and open the door to the
possibility of a more favorable future credit score.26 Chapter 13
bankruptcy involves creating a payment plan in which the debtor pays
off her debts to creditors out of her future income.27 A bankruptcy court
then must confirm the plan.28 The plan allows a debtor to pay back some
22. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“[C]hapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title” apply to chapters 7, 11, 12,
and 13.).
23. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 592 (declining to address concerns about the turnover provision’s
operation or other subsections of Section 362).
24. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
25. GENEVIEVE HEBERT FAJARDO & RAMONA L. LAMPLEY, 28 TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES:
CONSUMER RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 3D § 16.17, Westlaw (database updated June 2020).
26. Id. Chapter 7 is liquidation bankruptcy, in which the debtor’s assets are sold to repay
debts. A discharge is what a debtor receives in bankruptcy, which essentially eliminates any debt
acquired before the debtor filed, even if it was not completely paid off. This is why bankruptcy is
often described as a fresh start.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1321.
28. Id. § 1325.
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of her debts over the course of three to five years.29 Individuals may file
chapter 13 bankruptcies only if they can prove that their creditors will
receive at least as much as they would have under a chapter
7 bankruptcy.30
One of the most important provisions in the Bankruptcy Code
creates the automatic stay, which “gives the debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors.”31 The automatic stay has often been compared to an
injunction, prohibiting both formal and informal collection methods
against the debtor once she has filed for bankruptcy.32 The list of these
prohibited collection attempts can be found in § 362(a), and the
exceptions are very limited.33 The automatic stay is, as it sounds,
automatic.34 It is triggered by the debtor filing a bankruptcy petition
and does not require a motion to the bankruptcy court or even notice
to creditors.35
Until 1973, the automatic stay provisions were available only
under chapter X, and the debtor had to make an affirmative application
to restrain collection efforts.36 With the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, the debtor received an automatic stay, getting
rid of the injunction application process.37 The burden then shifted to
29. Id. § 1325(b)(4).
30. Id. § 1325(a)(4). In a chapter 7 case, the debtor’s assets are immediately liquidated, and
there is not a payment plan. Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Jan. 31,
2021) [https://perma.cc/K5EU-RHLQ].
31. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978). Essentially, the automatic stay freezes all debt collection
efforts made against the debtor by creditors. In a chapter 13 case, the automatic stay can last the
entire length of the plan because the debtor makes periodic payments based on the regular income.
There are certain exceptions regarding domestic support obligations, tax refunds, and licenses that
do not bear on this general analysis. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (exceptions to the stay include criminal
actions against the debtor, certain civil actions, domestic support obligations, and more).
32. Claudia A. Restrepo, Comment, A Pro Debtor and Majority Approach to the “Automatic
Stay” Provision of the Bankruptcy Code—In re Cowen Incorrectly Decided, 59 B.C. L. REV. ESUPPLEMENT 537, 540 (2018).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (listing what the automatic stay prohibits); Id. § 362(b) (listing
the exceptions).
34. MICHAEL D. SIROTA & MICHAEL S. MEISEL, 44 N.J. PRACTICE SERIES: DEBTOR-CREDITOR
LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.31, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2020).
35. McKeen v. FDIC, 549 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Ga. 2001); SIROTA & MEISEL, supra note 34.
36. WILLIAM L. NORTON III, 2 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D § 43:2, Westlaw
(database updated Jan. 2021). Before the new Code, bankruptcy chapters were referred to using
roman numerals.
37. Id. Congress enacted this change as the Code became more debtor friendly over time. See
id. (“The burden was shifted to the creditor who sought to obtain relief from the stay to file a
complaint in an adversary proceeding upon a showing of cause.”). Previously, the bankruptcy court
had jurisdiction only over property in the debtor’s possession, whether actual or constructive. See
id. § 43:1 (discussing the difference between the historical jurisdiction that bankruptcy courts had
over straight bankruptcy cases and rehabilitation cases). After reforms, the automatic stay existed
only in the former Chapter X, which covered corporate bankruptcy and is now revised into Chapter
11. See id. § 43:2. With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the automatic
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the creditor to request relief from the stay.38 The precise language of
§ 362(a)(3) has remained unchanged since 1984, when Congress
amended the provision to prohibit “any act to . . . exercise control over
property of the estate.”39 The automatic stay also protects creditors’
rights by ensuring the bankruptcy filing does not trigger a race to
collect.40 Without it, the creditors who are able to act first would deplete
the resources of the estate before the court decides how to distribute the
debtor’s assets for the benefit of all creditors.41
The automatic stay provision works in tandem with the turnover
provision of § 542(a), which states that a creditor “shall deliver to the
trustee . . . [any]
property . . . unless
such
property
is
of
inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.”42 Disagreement remains
over whether the turnover provision is self-operative, though the word
“shall” indicates to many courts and scholars that § 542(a) is selfexecuting and mandatory.43 For example, if the turnover provision is
not self-executing and mandatory, the trustee in a bankruptcy case
would have to initiate a turnover proceeding every time a debtor wanted
to regain possession of her car from the City of Chicago.44 Although the
Court did not address the ultimate question of how the bankruptcy
court should treat the turnover provision, the Fulton decision held that
maintaining possession until the turnover order does not violate the

stay was applied to all bankruptcy cases. Id. This meant that creditors could not pick apart
bankruptcy estates to the detriment of all other creditors. See id. § 43:1 (describing
bankruptcy courts’ authority to institute an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors
are treated equally).
38. Id. § 43:2.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). See generally Ralph Brubaker, Turnover, Adequate Protection, and
the Automatic Stay (Part I): Origins and Evolution of the Turnover Power, 33 BANKR. L. LETTER,
Aug. 2013, Westlaw 33 No. 8 BLL-NL 1 (discussing the 1984 amendments). Additional major
amendments occurred in 1994 and 2005, but these concerned exceptions to the automatic stay and
did not change the language of § 362(a)(3). See NORTON III, supra note 36, § 43:3 (referencing the
1994 and 2005 amendments).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977).
41. The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate, which consists of “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1). Consequently, if a creditor obtains property of the estate, it adversely affects all other
creditors because the estate consists of everything the debtor owns.
42. Id. § 542(a).
43. See, e.g., In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that “shall” in § 542(a)
makes turnover compulsory); 3A BANKRUPTCY SERVICE LAWYERS EDITION Absolute Nature of
Turnover Duty § 30:11 Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2021) (collecting cases that discuss the
mandatory nature of the turnover duty). But see In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 128 (3d Cir.
2019) (rejecting the notion that turnover is self-executing). The Third Circuit partly relied on this
difference in their holding that passive retention of estate property does not violate the automatic
stay. See infra Section II.B (discussing the Third Circuit’s assertion that an “act” requires more
than retaining possession).
44. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1).
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automatic stay.45 This means that until the turnover proceeding is held
and decided, a debtor is left without her vehicle.
Section 361, the adequate protection provision, must also be
taken into account when considering the turnover provision and the
automatic stay.46 A creditor can request adequate protection in any case
to protect its interest in the property it is turning over,47 and a court
will grant adequate protection measures to acknowledge any
depreciation an asset may undergo once the property is turned over.48
For example, in cases involving vehicles, there is a valid concern that
the creditor’s interest in the car will decrease or disappear if the debtor
is in an accident or any other damage occurs to the vehicle.49 Protection
can take the form of periodic cash payments on the property or
requiring insurance coverage on the property.50 If the trustee cannot
provide adequate protection, the court may prohibit the use of the
property.51 A creditor must affirmatively request adequate protection,
or it will lose the opportunity to obtain it.52
If the turnover provision has a higher priority in the Code, i.e.,
is self-executing and mandatory, then a creditor must turn over the
property prior to receiving adequate protection.53 If the adequate
protection provision controls, then a creditor is not required to turn over
property until it receives adequate protection.54 The Supreme Court
recently reiterated that it is unclear how the turnover provision is
expected to operate in lower courts, leaving it up to the lower courts to
parse out details regarding the interaction between adequate protection
and the turnover provision.55

45. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 587 (2021).
46. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-362, 542.
47. Chase Manhattan Bank USA NA v. Stembridge (In re Stembridge), 394 F.3d 383, 387
(5th Cir. 2004).
48. Id.
49. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, City of Chicago v. Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 680 (2019) (No.
19-357).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1); In re Denby-Peterson, 576 B.R. 66, 81–82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017) (not
addressed on appeal in In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2019)); 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 361.03[2] (Henry J. Sommer & Richard Levin eds., 16th ed. 2020).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). The trustee is the appointed custodian and administrator of the
bankruptcy estate. He or she possesses extensive powers in order to perform his or her duty of
maximizing the value of the estate. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 509 (2020).
52. TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 682 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999).
53. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that turnover is compulsory upon
filing or else the adequate protection provision would be rendered meaningless).
54. In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 128 (holding that because the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure list procedural requirements to initiate a turnover, turnover is not selfexecuted upon a debtor’s filing).
55. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 592 (2021).
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B. Supreme Court Decisions on Turnover and the Automatic Stay
The Supreme Court has sparingly dealt with actions regarding
violations of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay,56 even though the
stay is one of the Code’s most litigated provisions.57 In United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., the Court examined whether the IRS must return
property seized under a tax lien when a debtor files for chapter 11
bankruptcy.58 The Court resolved this issue under the turnover
provision, rather than the automatic stay provision.59 Explaining that
although outside of bankruptcy obtaining possession of property may be
an available manner in which a creditor can enforce its lien, the Court
noted that bankruptcy law “modifies the procedural rights” otherwise
held by the creditor.60 Because the estate in question was so broad, it
did not matter that the debtor may not have had a possessory interest
in the property pre-petition.61 Several provisions in the Code envision
bringing property not currently in the debtor’s possession into the
bankruptcy estate.62 The Court highlighted that instead of excluding
property a secured creditor may have had an interest in from the estate,
Congress provided creditors with the option of adequate protection.63
Therefore, the turnover provision “requires the [creditor] to seek
protection of its interest according to the congressionally established
bankruptcy procedures, rather than by withholding the seized property
from the debtor’s efforts to reorganize.”64
In Whiting Pools, the Court ordered the IRS to return the seized
collateral in question.65 The Court did not, however, directly address
whether the turnover of the estate property must occur before or after
the creditor secures adequate protection. The Court in Whiting Pools

56. In fact, from 1982–2017, only 2.5 percent of the Court’s civil cases dealt with the entire
Bankruptcy Code. RONALD J. MANN, BANKRUPTCY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 31 (2017). Mann,
a Columbia law professor, goes as far as to say that the Court remains “systematically
underinformed about the importance of the Bankruptcy Power and the relief it provides.” Id. Why
the Supreme Court does not regularly grant petitions to these cases remains unclear.
57. Lawrence Ponoroff, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Continuing Legal Educ., Understanding the Law of
Bankruptcy—A Primer on Basic Bankruptcy Rules, Concepts, and Policies (Mar. 26–28, 2003),
Westlaw SH042 ALI-ABA 1, at *16.
58. 462 U.S. 198, 200–202 (1983).
59. Id. at 202–08 (examining the issue under the § 542).
60. Id. at 206.
61. Id. at 205.
62. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 543, 547-48).
63. Id. at 203–04.
64. Id. at 212.
65. Id. at 210–12.
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ordered creditors not to engage in self-help66—in that case, maintaining
possession—to acquire adequate protection.67
The Supreme Court complicated matters by carefully parsing
what constitutes property in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf,
which examined the automatic stay provision.68 In Strumpf, a bank
placed an administrative freeze on a debtor’s account because he had
taken out a loan.69 The Court held that such a freeze did not violate the
automatic stay because it did not permanently deduct the amount in
the debtor’s account, as a setoff would.70
Most notably, the Court held that placing an administrative
freeze on a bank account did not violate § 362(a)(3) of the automatic
stay provision because the creditor did not take something from the
debtor, nor did it “exercis[e] dominion over property that belonged to
[the debtor].”71 The bank account was only a promise of the bank to pay
the debtor, not his actual money.72 Although the debtor could not gain
possession of money that was rightfully his, the Court hinted that the
automatic stay provision may be more complicated than previously
thought by distinguishing a bank account as a promise to pay and not
actual property.73 The Court did not, however, address the implications
of its holding for bankruptcy cases where creditors exercise control
over the debtor’s actual property, as in the vehicle cases addressed in
this Note.74
The Bankruptcy Code, while developing steadily since the 1970s,
still contains ambiguities in some of its most central provisions.75 The
breadth of the automatic stay and the relationship between the
automatic stay, turnover, and adequate protection still confound
debtors and creditors.76 Without knowing exactly how these provisions
66. Self-help would be efforts the creditor takes unilaterally to enforce the debt outside of the
bankruptcy case.
67. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 211–12.
68. 516 U.S. 16, 17 (1995).
69. This case mainly discusses § 362(a)(7), which places a stay on “setoff” rights. In Strumpf,
the bank would not pay withdrawals on the account up to the amount the debtor owed on the loan.
For example, if the debtor wrote a check for $20, the bank would not execute the payment. See id
at 17–18 (explaining the nature of the bank’s actions).
70. Id. at 19. An example of a setoff is when the creditor has $300 of the debtor’s money in its
possession, but the debtor also owes the creditor $1,000. The creditor would apply the $300 to the
debt and say that the debtor now only owes it $700.
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id.
73. Michael R. Herz, An Accelerating Thaw: Revisiting the Legality of Administrative Bank
Freezes, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2012, at 40, 41–43.
74. Strumpf, 516 U.S. at 16.
75. See infra Part II (discussing one such ambiguity).
76. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 19–20, City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021)
(No. 19-357), 2020 WL 583728 (discussing unsettled state of the law).
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operate, parties who find themselves in bankruptcy court cannot know
their rights and obligations.77
II. CURRENT LAW AND ITS EMERGENCE
The Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton that
passive retention of estate property does not violate the automatic
stay.78 As a dichotomous question, it is important to understand the two
approaches the Court could have taken—previously the majority and
the minority approach. This Section first explores how circuit courts
attempted to answer the passive retention question and then explains
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in reaching its ultimate, yet limited,
decision with regard to § 362(a).
Courts were previously split on the proper interpretation of the
automatic stay provision, which prohibits “any act to obtain possession
of property of the estate . . . or to exercise control over property of the
estate.”79 The most common dispute over the meaning of “any act . . . to
exercise control” surrounded instances in which a creditor had
repossessed a debtor’s vehicle, though the statutory language applies to
all types of property.80 Five circuits and the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel held that retention of property of the estate possessed
before the debtor filed for bankruptcy must be immediately turned over
to the bankruptcy trustee, without first requiring a turnover motion or
adequate protection.81 Three circuits held directly the opposite: that
passive retention is not a creditor exercising control over property of the
estate and therefore does not violate the automatic stay.82
The binary nature of “yes, it violates the stay” or “no, it does not
violate the stay” meant that the Supreme Court had to adopt either the

77. Compare In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that creditors must
turnover all property upon the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy), with In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d
115, 128 (3rd Cir. 2019) (holding that creditors are not required to turnover property immediately).
78. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 587 (2021).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
80. See, e.g., Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009)
(emphasis omitted) (debtor defaulted on car payments and the creditor seized the car pre-petition);
WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017) (lien placed on truck prepetition and the creditor seized the car).
81. See In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 920 (holding that creditors must turnover all property upon
the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy); Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013)
(same); Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier), 376 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (same); Cal. Emp. Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996)
(same); Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1989) (same).
82. See In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 119 (holding that creditors are not required to
turnover property immediately); In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949–51(same); United States v. Inslaw,
Inc., 932 F.2d. 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same).
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majority’s or the minority’s approach.83 Because the Supreme Court
cannot change the statute, it must continue to deal with the text as is.
While the majority approach effectuated more accurate policy goals, its
analysis of the statutory text was flawed.84 The minority approach,
while more faithful to the text of the Bankruptcy Code, disadvantages
debtors in a way that seems incongruous with the spirit of the Code.85
Because neither approach fully addresses both the text of the
Bankruptcy Code and the policy concerns behind it, the Supreme Court
ruling on this issue remains inadequate. The Fulton case resulted in
the Court adopting much of the minority approach, although its
reasoning was based mostly on a natural reading of the text and
potential problems with the turnover provision if § 363(a) were to be
interpreted differently.86
A. Majority Approach: Policy and Practical Considerations
with No Roots in the Text
The circuits previously following the majority approach adopted
a debtor-friendly approach, holding that creditors are obligated to
immediately turn over any property seized prior to the bankruptcy
filing.87 Under this approach, Chicago, located in the Seventh Circuit,
would have to return any of the vehicles seized for unpaid parking
tickets as soon as it had knowledge that the debtor had filed for
bankruptcy.88 The majority approach purported that it faithfully
interpreted the text, although it did so by ignoring certain language in
the automatic stay provision.89 This approach, however, would have
broadened the automatic stay, which is more in line with the policy
considerations of giving the debtor a breathing spell and protecting
assets from audacious creditors.90 Ultimately, this approach succeeded

83. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct 680 (2019).
84. See infra Section II.A.
85. See infra Section II.B.
86. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 590–92 (2021).
87. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 924; Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir.
2013); Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier), 376 F.3d 1323, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam); Cal. Emp. Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996);
Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989).
88. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 924.
89. See, e.g., id. at 923 (with the subheading “exercise control”).
90. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203–05 (1983) (“Congress intended
a broad range of property to be included in the estate.”); In re Sharon, 234 B.R. 676, 685 (B.A.P.
6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the onus is on creditors to return improperly seized assets and not on
the debtor to go and get them).
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in its policy considerations, but failed in its textual analysis, leading the
Supreme Court to reject it.91
1. Textual Analysis: The Majority’s Focus on “Exercise Control”
The majority approach elevated policy and practical
considerations in its interpretation of the automatic stay and turnover
provisions. This approach required creditors to return to the debtor
property that had been seized pre-petition.92 By reading § 362(a)(3)
more liberally, this approach effectuates increased debtor protection
and gives a bankruptcy petition more power. It does so by focusing on
the “exercise control” language of § 362(a)(3) rather than the more
complete phrase “any act . . . to exercise control.”93 “Exercising control”
alone does not require an “act,” whereas “any act . . . to exercise control”
does require some affirmative activity.94 This focus made it easier for
the courts to conclude that “holding onto an asset, refusing to return it,
and otherwise prohibiting a debtor’s beneficial use of an asset all fit
within th[e] definition, as well as the commonsense meaning of the
word[s ‘exercise control’].”95 Because of this broader interpretation,
courts could easily determine that there is no difference between
property a creditor seized before the debtor filed for bankruptcy and
passively retains and property a creditor seizes in the middle of a
bankruptcy case. If courts equate maintaining possession with
exercising control, then failure to return the property, “regardless of
whether the original seizure was lawful, constitutes a prohibited
attempt to ‘exercise control over the property of the estate’ in violation
of the automatic stay.”96 Therefore, for example, even if the City of
Chicago legally impounded a debtor’s vehicle for failure to pay parking
or traffic violations, it would have to immediately return the car when
the debtors file for bankruptcy.97 The majority courts treated the prepetition seizure just as if the city had seized the car one year into the
bankruptcy proceeding, which is clearly forbidden.
The majority courts also cited legislative history to support their
reading of the text, though their analysis was often fleeting and
91 City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021).
92. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 921; In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 79; In re Rozier, 376 F.3d at 1324;
In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F.3d at 1151; In re Knaus, 889 F.2d. at 775.
93. See, e.g., In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 923 (with the subheading “exercise control”).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
95. Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2009).
96. In re Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775.
97. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-100-120 (making it legal to impound a debtor’s vehicle); In
re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 923 (requiring the creditor to return the seized asset once the debtor
declares bankruptcy).
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conclusory. These courts argued that because the language of the Code
was amended from “to obtain possession” to “to obtain possession
or . . . to exercise control,” Congress intended to broaden the scope of
§ 362(a)(3).98 According to this reasoning, the change from prohibiting
mere possession indicated that Congress meant to encompass
something more.99 Bankruptcy courts following the majority approach
often spoke of the legislative history in either veiled or clearly offered
assumptions. One court phrased its legislative history analysis in these
terms: the congressional amendment “hints [ ] that this kind of ‘control’
might be a broadening of the concept of possession . . . .”100 Another
court stated what Congress’s intent was without explanation: the
language “was added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 to clarify that the automatic stay extends to any
exercise of control over property of the estate . . . .”101
The legislative history, however, contains no explanation or
commentary as to why Congress made this change.102 While Congress
clearly intended to expand the automatic stay by enacting changes to
the code in 1984, the majority approach’s conclusion that it must extend
to all exercises of control over estate property is not definitive. Thus,
while the majority approach’s textual analysis was suspicious,
its interpretation of § 362(a)(3) had a stronger foundation on
other grounds.
2. Policy Concerns: A True Breath of Fresh Air
Policy and practical considerations mainly drove the majority’s
textual analysis, and this becomes clear when one considers the
ramifications of any alternative interpretation. These courts sought to
benefit the debtor by returning their property, which would in turn put
creditors on a more even playing field. Relying on Whiting Pools, the
Seventh Circuit in In re Fulton stated that the “primary goal” of
reorganization bankruptcy is to “group all of the debtor’s property
together in his estate . . . this necessarily extends to all property, even
property lawfully seized pre-petition.”103

98. In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F.3d at 1151.
99. Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702; In re Young 193 B.R. 620, 623 (Bankr. D.C. 1996).
100. Javens v. City of Hazel Park (In re Javens), 107 F.3d 359, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added).
101. Abrams v. Sw. Leasing and Rental Inc. (In re Abrams), 127 B.R. 239, 241 (9th Cir.
B.A.P. 1991).
102. In re Young, 193 B.R. at 624 (citation omitted).
103. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203–04 (1983)).
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Likewise, the court in Thompson v. General Motors also outlined
major policy concerns shared by many circuit courts in the majority
approach that favored placing the burden on the creditor to seek judicial
relief.104 First, the purpose of bankruptcy is to allow the debtor to
“regain his financial foothold.”105 Therefore, while the Bankruptcy Code
benefits both creditors and debtors, the primary goal is to aid the
unfortunate debtor. In the case of a seized car, it greatly benefits the
debtor to have her car returned to her. Without the car, it could be
difficult for her to get to work, only compounding financial troubles.
Second, adopting the alternative approach would give creditors too
much bargaining power in that they could hold onto property until they
subjectively felt they were adequately protected.106 For example, the
City of Chicago could demand not only insurance but also periodic
payments to account for depreciation of the vehicle. Third, in Whiting
Pools, the Court made clear that such self-help is prohibited under the
Bankruptcy Code.107 Creditors may not pursue collection efforts outside
of the bankruptcy case.108 Lastly, requiring a creditor to bear the costs
of seeking relief assists not only the debtor but all of the creditors.109
Having all creditors file one motion in court is far less demanding than
having the debtor file “a myriad of motions” to recover his assets.110
Filing turnover motions and enduring adequate protection proceedings
often involves an attorney, whose fees come out of the “pot” of the
debtor’s assets. If the “pot” is needlessly depleted, all creditors end up
with less than they would have had otherwise.
The majority courts adopted a broad reading of “exercise control”
because it best enables a debtor to use her own property, which is vitally
important for the completion of some bankruptcy cases. For example,
perhaps only with the return of her car can a debtor get to work, which

104. Thompson, 566 F.3d at 706–07.
105. Id. at 706.
106. Id. at 707; see also TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 685
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (“A Chapter 13 debtor’s right to possession and use of her car [should] not
[be] dependent on the subjective judgment of a creditor . . . .”). Courts also see this as better policy
for creditors who do not withhold a turnover and would suffer the cost because the debtor would
be less able to pay all creditors back. See Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d
773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that if creditors could maintain possession until they felt
protected, “the powers of a bankruptcy court and its officers to collect the estate for the benefit of
creditors would be vastly reduced”).
107. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203–04.
108. See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (holding that passively continuing to possess property is
an exercise of control by creditors).
109. See id. at 707 (reasoning that allowing free use of assets by the debtor is better for both
the debtor and creditors).
110. Id.

844

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:829

benefits not only herself but also her creditors who expect to be repaid
through a successful plan.111
B. Minority Approach: Faithful Adherence to the
Text with Harsh Consequences
The three circuits in the minority approach—which the Supreme
Court adopted—held that creditors do not have an affirmative
obligation to immediately return property seized legally pre-petition.112
This approach interprets the text of the automatic stay provision more
completely, reading the entire phrase of the statute rather than
focusing on certain words in isolation (“any act . . . to exercise control”
rather than “ . . . exercise control” alone).113 Because this approach is
now law, all debtors are subject to potential collection efforts by
creditors who can enforce their debts outside of the bankruptcy process
by maintaining possession.114
1. Textual Analysis: The Minority’s Focus On “Act”
In 1991, the D.C. Circuit became the first circuit court to adopt
the minority approach that passive retention of estate property does not
violate § 362(a)(3).115 In United States v. Inslaw, Inc., the debtor was a
corporation that created a case-tracking software under contract for the
Department of Justice.116 Even after the corporation filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy, the Department of Justice continued to use the software
and introduced it into other U.S. Attorney offices.117 The court held that
since the debtor did not have a possessory interest in the tapes
containing the software, the Department of Justice did not violate the
automatic stay by maintaining possession.118 The D.C. Circuit Court
emphasized the “act” language of § 362(a)(3) in its textual analysis and
claimed to be more accurately interpreting the statute when it stated
that “[n]owhere in [§ 362(a)]’s language is there a hint that it creates

111. In re Sharon, 234 B.R. at 682.
112. See In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (adopting the minority
approach); Cowen v. WD Equip., LLC (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 2017) (adopting
the minority approach); United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d. 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(adopting the minority approach).
113. See, e.g., Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1474.
114. See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 706 (reasoning that the minority approach allows for creditors
in possession to exercise more power).
115. Inslaw, 932 F.2d. at 1474.
116. Id. at 1468.
117. Id. at 1468–69.
118. Id. at 1472.
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an affirmative duty to remedy past acts of . . . harassment as soon as a
debtor files a bankruptcy petition.”119
The other circuits that joined the minority approach better
elaborated why the focus is on the “any act” language—perhaps because
they had more to prove as the majority approach grew stronger.120
Instead of focusing on “exercise control,” as did the majority, the
minority approach turned first to the beginning of the provision and
asked if “any act” had occurred.121 Breaking the grammar down even
more finely, one judge wrote that “ ‘any act’ is the prepositive modifier
of [the] infinitive phras[e].”122 Because holding onto something does not
change the “status quo,” no act occurs at all.123 This means that an
exercise of control (like maintaining possession) alone is not sufficient
to violate the automatic stay.124 To violate the stay in these circuits, the
creditor must have actually done something, such as seized the vehicle,
after the bankruptcy case had begun.
While the courts advocating for the majority approach insisted
that the legislative history supported their interpretation, the minority
circuits asserted that their approach held more closely to congressional
intent. The Tenth Circuit in In re Cowen stated that “Congress does not
‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’ . . . If Congress had meant to add an
affirmative obligation . . . to turn over property belonging to the estate,
it would have done so explicitly.”125
The legislative history analysis differed slightly among courts in
the minority.126 The D.C. Circuit in Inslaw stated that “Congress gave
no explanation” when it added the “exercise control” language to
§ 362(a), though it mentioned in passing that one court had traced the
language back to the 1978 Bankruptcy Act.127 The 1978 Act Senate
Report reveals Congress intended for the property covered by the
automatic stay to be only “property over which the estate has control or

119. Id. at 1474.
120. See In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 125 (3d Cir. 2019) (interpreting “any act” to
require an affirmative, not passive, act); Cowen v. WD Equip., LLC (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943,
949 (10th Cir. 2017) (interpreting “any act” to require “doing something”, which does not include
“passively holding onto an asset”).
121. John T. Gregg, Big Things Have Small Beginnings–Passive Retention of Property of the
Estate Repossessed Prepetition, 28 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 220, 236–41 (2019).
122. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949.
123. Gregg, supra note 121.
124. Denby-Peterson v. Nu2u Auto World, 595 B.R. 184, 190 (D.N.J. 2018).
125. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949–50 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457, 468).
126. See, e.g., In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 124 (3d Cir. 2019); In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at
949–50; United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1473 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
127. Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1473 n.3.
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possession.”128 Therefore, property seized pre-petition, such as a car
with overdue parking tickets, could not fall under the automatic stay
because the debtor did not have possession of the car when the case
began. The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, relied solely on the 1984
amendments to the Code.129 It held that Congress’s addition of the word
“control” meant only to distinguish the new language from acts to obtain
possession, which were already prohibited.130 In this way, the court
argued, Congress meant to prohibit only other acts that exercise control,
such as a creditor selling off estate property that was in its possession
or taking advantage of intangible property that was not concretely in
anyone’s possession.131 In the vehicle cases, this means the city is
prohibited only from selling the debtors’ vehicles that it had seized prior
to the filings.132 Lastly, the Third Circuit did not rely on the legislative
history at all, asserting that the language “act . . . to exercise control”
clearly indicated that maintaining possession of estate property does
not violate the automatic stay.133 Even though the minority circuits
could not agree why the legislative history did support (or was
irrelevant to) their collective interpretation, the minority’s strongest
textual arguments rested on the plain meaning of the words in the
Code. And because the plain meaning argument itself does not require
a consideration of legislative history, it therefore remains persuasive.134
2. Policy Concerns: Protecting Creditors’ Rights
While textual arguments drive the minority approach, the Third
Circuit claimed that its approach also effectuates bankruptcy’s policy
goals, albeit different goals from the debtor-friendly majority
approach.135 The Third Circuit asserted “that one of the automatic
stay’s primary purposes is ‘to maintain the status quo between the

128. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 50 (1978).
129. See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949–50 (relying on statutory amendments to assist in
statutory interpretation).
130. Id. at 949 (citing Ralph Brubaker, Turnover, Adequate Protection, and the Automatic Stay
(Part II): Who Is “Exercising Control” Over What?, 33 BANKR. L. LETTER, Sept. 2013, Westlaw 33
No. 9 BLL-NL 1).
131. Id. at 950.
132. The City of Chicago did, however, improperly sell some of the seized vehicles for scrap
metal in order to offset the ticket debts. Oral Argument at 11:21, In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th
Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2527), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2019/cm.18-2527.18-2527_05_14_
2019.mp3 [https://perma.cc/D7XX-ZK58].
133. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); see In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 124–25 (3d Cir. 2019)
(claiming that because the language is unambiguous, the court need not look to legislative history).
134. See generally Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537–39 (2015) (discussing at depth
the plain-meaning rule of statutory interpretation).
135. In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 126.
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debtor and [his] creditors, thereby affording the parties and the
[Bankruptcy] Court an opportunity to appropriately resolve competing
economic interests in an orderly and effective way.’ ”136 Many cases
repeated this “status quo” language as a maxim.137 In Chicago, the city
argued that the status quo would allow the city to continue keeping the
cars in impound lots, exactly where they were before the debtor filed
her bankruptcy petition.138 This seems to further a policy of not giving
debtors a possessory interest that they did not have at the beginning
of the case, but this argument is nowhere explicitly stated in the
circuit cases.
C. Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach
Because policy concerns drove the majority’s textual
interpretation, critics of the approach found fault with the choice to
analyze only the “exercise control” language of the statute and not the
more complete phrase, “any act . . . to exercise control . . . .”139 If a court
adopts the language’s plain meaning, the inclusion of the word “act”
prohibits affirmative actions taken only after the debtor files for
bankruptcy. If a creditor seized the property pre-petition, it is not
“acting” at all because it is not changing its position.140 The City of
Chicago even argued that if “any act . . . to exercise control” includes
every possible exercise of control over property of the estate, then the
words “any act” become surplusage.141 In the city’s mind, “any act” is

136. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Taylor v. Slick, 178 F.3d 698, 702 (3d Cir. 1999)).
137. See, e.g., In re Winters, 604 B.R. 54, 59 (Bankr. D. Utah 2019) (quoting First Nat’l Bank
v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981)) (“[The creditor] merely maintained the
status quo . . . . This is consistent with the purpose of the automatic stay provision.”); In re New
Am. Food Concepts, Inc., 70 B.R. 254, 257–58 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (“In litigation concerning
the automatic stay, the Code generally seeks to leave matters in a status quo posture, . . . to
provide a reasonable opportunity for a financially distressed debtor, its creditors, and the Court to
determine whether there are reasonable prospects for the debtor’s survival.”).
138. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 49, at 19.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); see Brubaker, supra note 130 (“The majority position is highly
dubious . . . driven more by certain ‘practical considerations’ . . . than a sound, principled
interpretation of the meaning of the relevant Code provisions.” (footnote omitted)); see also Anne
Zoltani & Janice Miller Karlin, Examining § 362(a)(3): When “Stay” Means Stay, 36 AM. BANKR.
INST. J., May 2017, at 20 (discussing the difference between a focus on “exercise control” and “any
act to exercise control”).
140. See United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (making it clear
that the act to exercise control over estate property must occur post-petition); John C. Chobot,
Some Bankruptcy Stay Metes and Bounds, 99 COM. L.J. 301, 307–08 (1994) (discussing how an
affirmative act is required to violate the stay).
141. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 49, at 19–20 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995)).
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obviously included in any “exercise of control.”142 Therefore, the more
specific word must be controlling.143
Additionally, requiring an affirmative action by the creditor
makes clear why Congress included the turnover provision in a
completely different section of the Code.144 If the turnover power was a
supplemental explanation of what creditors must do under the
automatic stay, it would not be free standing with no mention of its
connection to the automatic stay.145 The minority’s analysis of the
legislative history was more measured and did not assume that
Congress intended to broaden the stay as widely as the majority
claimed.146 After all, Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes.147
The majority’s approach, however, would have better enabled a
debtor to actually complete her plan. Without the necessary
transportation to go to work, a chapter 13 debtor will default, risking
dismissal of her case.148 A debtor’s life will not be the fresh start
envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code.149 Instead, following dismissal, she
will be in an even worse position—having spent time and money on the
case without receiving the discharge of debt. The majority’s
interpretation would benefit not only debtors, then, but also creditors,
who, upon dismissal, lose their collective action benefits and return to
individualized efforts.150
Even if a case is not dismissed, creditors are better off if a debtor
can access her vehicle. Because a debtor’s payment plan uses the last
six months of income to determine the debtor’s ability to pay creditors
in chapter 12 and 13 cases, creditors also benefit if the debtor’s income
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012) (discussing the
“ancient interpretive principle that the specific governs the general (generalia specialibus
non derogant)”).
144. Brubaker supra note 39, at 4.
145. Id. at 6, 7.
146. See WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 949–50 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)) (“If Congress had meant to add an
affirmative obligation—to the automatic stay provision no less, as opposed to the turnover
provision—to turn over property belonging to the estate, it would have done so explicitly.”).
147. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).
149. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (regarding potential dismissal); TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In
re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 682 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (illustrating the majority approach); Melissa
Sanchez & Sandhya Kambhampati, How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists into
Bankruptcy, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 27, 2018), https://features.propublica.org/driven-into-debt/chicagoticket-debt-bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/C9H2-HCM2] (illustrating the cycle of Chapter 13
bankruptcy filings by car owners with unpaid tickets, dismissals, and efforts to collect by Chicago).
The collective action benefits of bankruptcy are widely known. See, e.g., MARGARET HOWARD &
LOIS R. LUPICA, BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (6th ed. 2015) (explaining how bankruptcy
law is in part “a device for the resolution of the collective interests of creditors”).
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was larger.151 While purporting to protect creditors’ rights, the minority
approach ultimately disadvantages them because there is a decreased
chance of a successful plan completion and lower plan payments from
the beginning.152
Therefore, one can view a choice between the majority and
minority approaches as a choice between the lesser of two evils. Either
the policy goals are met or the text of the statute is adhered to, but one
cannot achieve both.
D. The Ultimate Decision
The Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Fulton acknowledged
the policy concerns at issue but chose to ground its holding in the
statute’s text and legislative history.153 By parsing the key words “stay,”
“act,” and “exercise control,” the Court determined that the “status quo”
interpretation adopted by the minority approach was “the most natural
reading.”154 In short, the Court’s choice not to separate the verb “act”
from “exercise control” proved fatal to the majority approach because
“saying that a person engages in an act to exercise his or her power over
a thing communicates more than merely having that power.”155
The Court also focused on the potential “serious problems” with
the turnover provision if § 362(a)(3) were to forbid passive retention.156
Although not a major worry for the lower courts, the Supreme Court
was concerned with the superfluity of a turnover provision if the
automatic stay were to cover passive retention.157 Additionally, because
the turnover provision does not require the return of property of
“inconsequential value,” any other reading of § 362(a)(3) would
contradict § 542.
The Court also addressed the legislative history of the Code,
adopting the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the 1984 amendments.
The Court argued that reading the automatic stay as imposing a
turnover obligation would be too large of a change for Congress to enact
without at least including a cross-reference to § 542 or an explicit
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (explaining how the bankruptcy court determines a debtor’s
disposable income to inform how her payment plan should look at confirmation of the plan).
152. See Bankr. Judges Div., Bankruptcy Basics, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 22–28 (Nov.
2011), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasics-post10172005.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PGQ5-SQT6] (outlining the basics to bankruptcy, which it purports to be beneficial to both debtors
and creditors).
153. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 592–94, (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 590 (majority opinion).
155. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
156. Id. at 590–92.
157. Id. at 590–91.
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statement of its new breadth.158 The Court, however, stated that it
“need not decide how the turnover obligation [of] § 542 operates” in the
Fulton case.159
Notably, Justice Sotomayor emphatically voiced her concerns
about how the Court’s decision would disproportionately affect minority
debtors.160 She described the vicious cycle debtors are placed in when
left without access to their cars and how the city’s passive retention
interferes “not only with debtors’ ability to earn an income and pay their
creditors but also with their access to childcare, groceries, medical
appointments, and other necessities.”161 Although the Court did not
address the turnover provision’s operation, Justice Sotomayor noted
that turnover proceedings are “essentially full civil lawsuits” and deny
debtors’ access to their vehicles for far too long.162 Despite the Court’s
hands being tied, she pled for Congress to intervene.163
III. SOLUTION: CONGRESS SHOULD FORBID “ANY EXERCISE OF
CONTROL” OVER ESSENTIAL PROPERTY
Any decision regarding the interpretation of the automatic stay
provision was bound to have a profound impact on not only chapter 13
cases but also chapters 11 and 12,164 as the automatic stay covers all
chapters of bankruptcy.165 Debtors need access to their vehicles in order
to get to work and make payments under their plans, or they risk
having their cases dismissed, particularly in chapter 13 cases.166
Chapter 11 debtors also operate as debtors in possession, meaning they
should have access to their property as they stand in for the role of the
trustee.167 Lastly, chapter 12 bankruptcy for family farmers and
fisherman will be greatly affected by the decision as it also involves a
158. Id. at 591–92.
159. Id. at 592.
160. Id. at 593–94 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 594.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 595.
164. See Bankr. Judges Div., supra note 152, at 22–28 (explaining bankruptcy basics). Chapter
7 bankruptcy is liquidation bankruptcy, where a debtor’s property is liquidated save for a few
exemptions. HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 17. Chapter 12 is similar to chapter 13, but it
is only for family farmers and family fisherman. Id. at 19. Chapter 11 is a reorganization
bankruptcy and is used mainly by businesses, though it is available to individuals. Id. at 18. In
Chapter 11, the business is allowed to maintain control of business operations. Id.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a).
166. Id. § 1307. Dismissal means that a debtor cannot obtain a discharge of her debt, the main
goal of filing for bankruptcy.
167. See HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 18 (explaining chapter 11 bankruptcy). Any
Supreme Court decision, however, would affect chapter 11 debtors unless it explicitly limits its
interpretation of the automatic stay to chapter 12 and 13.
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repayment plan. Debtors in chapter 12 may need trucks, equipment,
and other property necessary to continue running their businesses in
order to complete the plan.168
The Supreme Court, however, had only two choices in resolving
this issue—either possession of property of the estate seized prepetition violates the automatic stay, or it does not. In selecting one of
the possible choices, the Supreme Court was forced to adopt either the
textually dubious yet policy conscious majority approach, or the
textually faithful yet practically problematic minority approach.
Therefore, even though the split is now resolved, its resolution does not
present the best solution for anyone. As it stands, the provision’s text
does not effectuate the policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code.169 Thus, the
Court was left with a dilemma in which it was incapable of rendering a
satisfactory solution.
The Court’s decision will affect hundreds of thousands of
debtors, either positively or negatively.170 Last year alone, 774,940
people and businesses filed for bankruptcy.171 Specifically, 283,413 of
those people filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy.172 Because the Court
adopted the minority approach, all property seized pre-petition will not
be returned to any debtor until she initiates a turnover proceeding and,
if requested by the creditor, provides some type of adequate protection
such as proof of insurance or periodic payments for depreciation of
her car.173
The best solution for addressing the policy goals must be to
correct the text, so debtors can regain their property. The corrected
language must be tailored, however, to require creditors to return to
debtors only the property that is possibly needed to complete the plan.
In this way, creditors would be required to return essential items, such
as cars, but not luxury items, such as stereos.

168. Id. at 19.
169. See supra Section II.A.2 (analyzing the majority approach’s emphasis of policy over
strict textualism).
170. See Just the Facts: Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 2006-2017, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/03/07/just-facts-consumer-bankruptcy-filings-2006-2017
[https://perma.cc/U4N5-87U5] (showing hundreds of thousands of chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy
filings every year over the past decade).
171. Bankruptcy Filings Increase Slightly, U.S. CTS. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov
/news/2020/01/28/bankruptcy-filings-increase-slightly [https://perma.cc/QN3H-DFQU].
172. Id.
173. See supra Section II.B (discussing the implications of the minority approach).
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A. Possibility of Congressional Intervention
This Note proposes Congress amend the Bankruptcy Code to
resolve the lingering concerns and effectuate the policy and practical
goals that are at the heart of the Bankruptcy Code. The phrase “any
act . . . to exercise control” can be made clearer by amending the
provision to read that a stay is applicable to “any exercise of control over
property of the estate that the debtor may require for the successful
completion of its payment plan confirmed in a chapter 12 or 13 case.”
This language will effectuate the pro-debtor policy by removing
improper impediments to a successful completion of a bankruptcy plan,
and it will resolve the textual ambiguities with which both the majority
and minority approaches struggled.174
The amendment would expressly affect only chapter 13 and 12
debtors.175 Debtors would receive property necessary to the completion
of their payment plans, most likely their vehicles, immediately upon
filing. With the immediate return of their cars, the debtors will be able
to travel to work, earn money, and make payments on their plan with
less difficulty.
Congress does not often amend the Bankruptcy Code.176 The
Code’s last major overhaul was fifteen years ago, when Congress
enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).177 BAPCPA altered the automatic stay in
several ways, such as allowing continued collections of domestic support
obligations and eliminating the stay if there are indications that the
debtor has filed the bankruptcy petition with dishonest interests.178
Many viewed BAPCPA as creditor friendly, as it made filing for
bankruptcy more difficult and included harsh consequences for
“fraudulent” debtors.179 It also required debtors to undergo credit
counseling within 180 days before filing for bankruptcy, often
dissuading people from filing.180

174. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the textual interpretation adopted by the majority
approach); supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the textual interpretation adopted by the
minority approach).
175. This Note purposefully limits the amendment to cover only these chapters.
176. See HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 15. The different versions of the Bankruptcy
Code have been enacted in 1800, 1803, 1867, 1898, 1938, 1978, 1984, and 2005. Id. at 14–15.
177. Id. at 15.
178. Stuart Larsen, Understanding the New Semi-automatic Stay, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Mar. 2006, at 22, 22, 74–75.
179. Rachel Ruser, Note, Analysis of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 2 SPNA REV. 86, 86 (2006).
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (a person may not be a debtor if they have not undergone credit
counseling); Andrew S. Erickson, Pre-Petition Credit Counseling, 39 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan.
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Recently, however, Congress has shown interest in amending
the Code.181 In 2019, Congress enacted the Small Business
Reorganization Act.182 These amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
created special provisions related to small business debtors in chapter
11 and addressed certain issues with preferential transfers.183 Congress
expects the new Act to greatly aid small business debtors in
reorganization efforts, proof that perhaps Congress realized BAPCPA
was overly harsh on debtors.184 The SBRA reduces the costs of filing a
chapter 11 petition and automatically assigns a trustee to the case.185
As a result, a debtor will be less likely to make the mistakes that are
grounds for dismissal under BAPCPA.186 These recent Congressional
actions suggest hope that future amendments are possible and would
be beneficial to debtors.
B. Amending the Text to Effectuate Underlying Policy
1. The Automatic Stay Provision
Congress should amend § 362(a)(3) to read “any exercise of
control over property of the estate that the debtor may require for the
successful completion of its payment plan confirmed in a chapter 12 or
13 case.” As the Court’s decision in Fulton made clear, there is at
present no way to follow the policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code and
still remain faithful to the text.187 Congress must speak directly to
the issue.

2020, at 42, 42 (“[T]he taking of the credit-counseling course requirement pre-petition . . . became
an obstacle for individuals to overcome.”).
181. James B. Bailey & Andrew J. Shaver, What New Bankruptcy Law Means for Small
Businesses, BIRMINGHAM BUS. J., https://www.bizjournals.com/birmingham/news/2019/11/25/what
-new-bankruptcy-law-means-for-small-businesses.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2019, 9:24 AM CST)
[https://perma.cc/Y6NZ-2M8X].
182. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079. This act
amends the Bankruptcy Code.
183. House and Senate Pass Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 38 AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Sept. 2019, at 8, 8.
184. See id. (noting the Act was a bipartisan measure that would “streamline the bankruptcy
process by which small business debtors reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs”).
185. Lei Lei Wang Ekvall & Timothy Evanston, The Small Business Reorganization Act: Big
Changes for Small Businesses, BUS. L. TODAY (Feb. 14, 2020). https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/business_law/publications/blt/2020/02/small-business-reorg/ [https://perma.cc/G546-AENT].
186. Amy E. Vulpio, New Subchapter V May Be the Bankruptcy Lifeline Small Businesses Need
to Survive COVID-19, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP, https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resourcesalerts-New-Subchapter-V-May-be-the-Bankruptcy-Lifeline-Small-Businesses-Need-to-SurviveCOVID-19.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TWC3-W4QU].
187. See supra Section II.A (explaining the majority approach’s interpretation of Section 362
and its shortcomings).

854

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:829

The new language proposed by this Note reconciles the
contradictory approaches to the automatic stay. As both claimed to
interpret the Code’s plain meaning, Congress should make the relevant
provisions even clearer.188 The new language of the statute should
amend the automatic stay provision to prohibit “any exercise of control
over property of the estate that the debtor may require for the
successful completion of its payment plan confirmed in a chapter 12 or
13 case.” Congress will also have to make slight changes to the
turnover provision and indicate that it overrides the adequate
protection provision.189
Congress should altogether eliminate the word “act” from the
automatic stay, which currently reads “any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate . . . or to exercise control over property of the
estate.”190 The courts that took the majority approach ignored the words
“any act,” interpreting only “exercise control” in their plain meaning
analysis.191 Conversely, in their approach, the minority and Supreme
Court interpreted “any act” to mean that only an affirmative action by
a creditor violates the automatic stay,192 significantly narrowing the
breadth of the automatic stay. By eliminating the “act” language, any
textual arguments regarding “act” become moot, allowing the text to
match the policy considerations.193 “Any exercise of control” includes
maintaining possession as well as all other methods of control, not only
affirmative acts.194 In this way, Congress can allow bankruptcy courts
to adopt a more equitable approach without stretching the language of
the Code.
Further, amending the text would address lingering policy
concerns. The automatic stay is intended to aid in the collective action
of bankruptcy. Without grouping together the debtor’s property in the
estate, individual creditors can impermissibly pressure the debtor into
paying them back first, without regard for other creditors who may have

188. See Zoltani & Karlin, supra note 139, at 20–21 (analyzing the textual arguments of the
majority approach and the Tenth Circuit, which at the time of their article was the only court not
following the majority).
189. See 11 U.S.C. § 542 (the turnover provision); id. § 361 (the adequate protection provision).
190. Id. § 362(a)(3).
191. For example, see In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2019) (with the subheading
“Exercise Control”).
192. See Zoltani & Karlin, supra note 139, at 61 (noting the Tenth Circuit’s determination that
“some action is required to violate the automatic stay”).
193. See supra Section II.B.2. While the minority approach does give some attention to the
exercise control language, it does so considering only what types of acts are prohibited. Ralph
Brubaker, supra note 130.
194. In fact, this is already how the majority has been interpreting the automatic stay. See
supra Section II.A.
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priority by law.195 Prior to the ruling in In re Fulton, the City of Chicago
was pressuring debtors in exactly this way when it seized vehicles
before a person filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy and then refused to
return them.196 Before the city would release a car, it required a
motorist to “agre[e] to prioritize paying off ticket debt in their
bankruptcy payment plan . . . . This assured the city it would get paid
back more of what it was owed . . . .”197 By removing this tactic,
Congress can effectuate the “equality of distribution between similarly
-situated creditors,” a key goal in bankruptcy.198 While current numbers
have not been released, it would appear that the application of the
automatic stay to pre-petition property could affect 3,800 debtors in
Chicago alone.199 With the amendments this Note proposes, all debtors
would be positively impacted and able to retrieve their property without
the lengthy turnover proceedings currently required.
The addition of the words “property of the estate that the debtor
may require for the successful completion of its payment plan” would
require creditors to take affirmative action in regard only to property
that is essential for a debtor’s success in bankruptcy. For example, a
creditor would not have to return an expensive stereo system a debtor
offered as collateral, but it would have to return a tractor seized from a
family farmer debtor. The suggested new language would alleviate
some of the burdens on creditors, requiring that they return
only property that is obviously necessary to a successful completion of
the plan.
Further, the proposed language would not overly broaden the
automatic stay. There are two limitations to the language that make
the amendment less dramatic. First, by specifying that the property
must be arguably necessary for the completion of a payment plan
confirmed in a chapter 12 or 13 case, this provision would affect only
debtors who have filed in those chapters. Payment plans do not exist in
cases filed under chapter 7,200 and most businesses file under chapter

195. Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203–04 (1983)).
196. See 926 F.3d 916, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that vehicles seized pre-petition must
be returned to the debtor upon filing for bankruptcy); Sanchez, supra note 9.
197. Sanchez, supra note 9.
198. HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 15.
199. See Sanchez, supra note 9. The officials have not stated since In re Fulton how many cars
they had been incorrectly holding, but prior to the initiation of the now-prohibited policy, they
released 3,800 vehicles to debtors once the debtors filed for bankruptcy in 2016. Id.
200. HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 17–19. Because chapter 12 applies only to family
farmers and fisherman, I will not be discussing the implications of the language on chapter
12 extensively.
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11.201 The new language would affect a little over one third of all
bankruptcies filed.202 Second, by requiring that the property be
important to the completion of a plan, the provision would not apply in
all chapter 12 or 13 cases. If a creditor has possession of property of the
estate, the creditor would be required to return the property only if the
debtor would require it in order to earn money to pay off the plan.
One criticism of this amendment is that it simply adds more text
for courts to interpret. But because many of the previous circuit court
decisions regarding the interpretation of the text centered around a
concern for the return of the debtor’s vehicle, the application would be
workable.203 Once Congress amends the language of § 362(a)(3), the
clearest application of the provision will be to require returning
property that can be promptly assessed as critical for the debtor’s
successful competition of a payment plan.204 Even in chapter 12 cases,
the application of the new language should not be difficult. Examples of
“property of the estate that the debtor may require for the successful
completion of a payment plan” should appear readily—for example,
farm equipment, fishing nets or boats, and delivery trucks easily fall
within the new language proposed by this Note.
2. Amending Other Provisions
Congress should also resolve some of the confusion surrounding
the turnover provision of the Bankruptcy Code.205 This could include a
cross-reference between the automatic stay provision and the turnover
provision to address the Court’s concerns about superfluity
contradiction and about making large changes explicit.206 Due to the
hedged requirement regarding property required for successful
completion of a payment plan, not all property, the language would no
longer be superfluous.207 It would no longer be contradictory because of
201. Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Jan. 31, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/6Y56-MBVV].
202. See Bankruptcy Filings Increase Slightly, supra note 171. 774,940 total bankruptcies
were filed in 2019, and only 284,008 were chapter 12 or 13.
203. See, e.g, Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (debtor
defaulted on car payments and the creditor seized the car pre-petition); WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen
(In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017) (lien placed on truck pre-petition and the creditor
seized the car).
204. See Sanchez, supra note 9 (explaining the difficulties chapter 13 debtors face in making
plan payments when they do not have access to their vehicle that they drive to work).
205. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (the adequate protection provision); Id. § 542 (the turnover provision);
Brubaker, supra note 130.
206. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 591–92 (2021).
207. Id. at 591.
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the same limiting language in the amended § 362.208 Finally, it would
bring to light the interaction between the sections and acknowledge
that this is a major change in statutory turnover requirements.209
Congress should also make clear that the turnover provision
controls over the adequate protection provision, which it could do with
a minor reference between the provisions. One reason many creditors
maintain possession of property of the estate is because they do not see
the turnover provision as mandatory until adequate protection over
their security interest has been provided by the court.210 Without
requiring turnover to happen first, however, the proposed automatic
stay amendments will not be as effective. If a creditor may hold onto
vehicles until they receive court-ordered adequate protection, the policy
arguments that support the idea that maintaining possession of
property of the estate violates the automatic stay are reduced. The
debtor will still have to undergo court proceedings in order to regain
possession of her property.211 Therefore, by clarifying that the turnover
provision has priority over the adequate protection provision, many of
the policy goals would be embedded into the statute.
Adequate protection is a valid concern of creditors, as returning
a vehicle without insurance could cause serious problems if the debtor
gets in a car accident or otherwise destroys the car.212 But creditors
have ample protection to avoid such a concern.213 In the automatic stay
provision itself, the Code requires a court to “grant relief from the
stay . . . for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an
interest in property of such party in interest.”214 The creditor may seek
stay relief without notifying the debtor.215 Courts will not potentially
nullify liens by returning uninsured vehicles to debtors. As one court
noted, courts “take[ ] the lack of insurance seriously and will not permit
a debtor to obtain or retain possession of a vehicle that is not adequately

208. Id.
209. Id. at 592.
210. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 76 at 9.
211. In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 128 (3d Cir. 2019).
212. Hon. Eugene R. Wedoff, Return of Vehicles Seized Before a Chapter 13 Filing; Does the
Debtor Have to File a Turnover Motion?, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. J., APR. 2019, at 14, 14.
213. Id.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
215. Wedoff, supra note 212, at 14.
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insured.”216 Additionally, creditors may, from the beginning of the case,
refuse to return an uninsured vehicle.217 Courts can “retroactively
validate” a vehicle’s retention by granting a relief from the stay,
preventing any sanctions against the creditor for not returning the
vehicle.218 These alternative measures give reassurance to creditors
with legitimate concerns regarding adequate protection while requiring
creditors who seek only to enforce their own repayment to return an
insured vehicle immediately upon a debtor’s filing for chapter 13.219
CONCLUSION
In chapter 13 cases, a debtor often requires her vehicle to earn
money to make her plan payments. As the law currently stands,
however, creditors such as the City of Chicago are able to take these
vehicles and not return them to the debtor, even after she files for
bankruptcy. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is supposed to offer
debtors a chance to breathe by halting the collection efforts of all
creditors.220 Because the Bankruptcy Code envisions collective action as
an effective tool to fairly repay creditors, it also protects a debtor’s
remaining assets from dissipation by aggressive creditors trying to cut
the line.221 The automatic stay could be a mechanism to return some of
the most essential property to a debtor, thus effectuating the purpose
of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court, however, could not transform the
words of the Code to fit the purpose by itself. Therefore, Congress
should heed Justice Sotomayor’s request to reconsider the language
in §§ 362(a) and 542 and clarify what the automatic stay requires
of creditors.222
This Note proposes that Congress amend § 362(a)(3) to codify
language that would best effectuate the fundamental policy goals of the
Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, Congress should prohibit any exercise of
control over property of the estate that the debtor may require for

216. Stephens v. Guaranteed Auto, Inc. (In re Stephens), 495 B.R. 608, 615 n.8 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2013).
217. Wedoff, supra note 212, at 14.
218. Id.
219. Id.; Sanchez, supra note 9.
220. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
221. HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 13.
222. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 595 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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successful completion of a payment plan confirmed in a chapter 12 or
13 case. This new language would clarify the current textual
ambiguities in the automatic stay provision, allow debtors to regain
possession of essential property, and maintain creditors’ current rights
of adequate protection in a way that would benefit all parties involved
in a chapter 12 or 13 bankruptcy case.
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